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Resumen
Un componente importante de los paquetes de ajuste fiscal en la mayoría de países en desarrollo es el
recorte en la inversión pública, incluyendo los gastos en infraestructura (Roubini and Sachs, 1989;
Hicks, 1991; De Haan et al. 1996). El objetivo del presente trabajo es proveer un panorama de la
evolución del sector de infraestructura en América Latina (tanto el nivel del acervo como su calidad)
para poder evaluar si el sector de infraestructura se vio afectado profundamente durante el prolongado
periodo de estabilización macroeconómica en los 80s y 90s. Utilizando datos de 19 países de América
Latina, procedemos a evaluar las tendencias del acervo de infraestructura y de la calidad de dichos
acervos, comparando el desempeño de dicho sector con el mostrado por los siete países del Este
Asiático que presentan un mayor desarrollo. Segundo, evaluamos las tendencias del gasto en
infraestructura para las nueve (9) economías más importantes de América Latina. Específicamente,
evaluamos en qué grado los cambios en el gasto público en infraestructura  está asociado con
reducciones en el déficit fiscal y/o determinados por la privatización de infraestructura y el creciente
gasto privado en el sector. Finalmente, evaluamos la relación entre cantidad y calidad de la
infraestructura con el nivel de gasto utilizando un análisis econométrico para datos de panel.
Abstract
There is a long-standing literature that shows that fiscal adjustment is often implemented through
cuts in public investment, including infrastructure (Roubini and Sachs, 1989; Hicks, 1991; De Haan
et al. 1996).  In this respect, the present paper aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the
evolution of infrastructure stocks, quality and spending in Latin America in order to assess whether
the infrastructure sector suffer from the prolonged period of macroeconomic stabilization in the
1980s and 1990s. First, we assess trends in quantity and quality of infrastructure using data on 19
Latin American countries, and we compare them to the performance of the seven “East Asian
miracle” countries. Second, we look at trends in infrastructure spending for 9 major Latin American
countries on which we have country data. Here we examine to what extent changes in public
infrastructure spending were linked to fiscal deficit reductions and driven by the privatization of
infrastructure and increased private spending on infrastructure. Finally, we assess the relationship of
infrastructure quantity and quality to the path of infrastructure spending in a panel data econometric
analysis.
___________________
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and should not be taken as those of the World Bank
or the Central Bank of Chile.
E-mail: ccaldero@bcentral.cl.1
1.  Introduction
Did the quantity and quality of Latin America’s infrastructure suffer from the prolonged
period of macroeconomic stabilization and fiscal austerity in the 1980s and 1990s?  To
address that question, this paper provides a comprehensive overview of the evolution of
Latin America’s infrastructure stocks, quality, and spending over the past decades.  The
paper does not attempt to answer the question posed in a formal econometric manner that
specifies the counterfactual of what would have happened if Latin America had not
entered a period of macroeconomic crisis.  Instead we give some illustrative facts that
may be consistent with some answers to this question and not with others.
There is a long-standing literature that notes that fiscal adjustment is often implemented
through cuts in public investment, including infrastructure. As Roubini and Sachs (1989)
note, “in periods of restrictive fiscal policies … capital expenditures are the first to be
reduced (often drastically).” During fiscal adjustment, the 1988 World Development
Report (p. 113) of the World Bank found that governments cut capital spending by far
more (about 35%) than other public sector categories like wages (about 10%). Likewise,
Hicks (1991) found that in countries with declining government expenditure 70-84,
governments cut capital expenditures by more (-27.8 percent) than current expenditures (-
7.2 percent). Serven (1997) found that Latin American public investment fell 2.5
percentage points of GDP from the 70s to the 80s, when the region was adjusting. East
Asia, which did not need to adjust in the 80s, had an increase of 3.7 percentage points.
The World Bank (1994) found that when African countries lowered their budget deficits
from 1981-86 to 1990-91, “most of the cuts were in capital spending” (p. 47). De Haan et
al. (1996) find that public investment is reduced during times of fiscal stringency in
OECD countries. Easterly (1999) argues that governments that do not really want to
adjust engage in the "illusion" of adjustment by cutting both public debt and public assets
(infrastructure).
First, we assess trends in quantity and quality of infrastructure using data on 19 Latin
American and Caribbean countries, excluding the smaller Caribbean economies because
their data availability is more limited and also to avoid influencing the region-wide
statistics with too many observations from small island economies. We take the seven
“East Asian miracle” countries as a comparator group against which we can judge the
performance of Latin America.
We then look at trends in infrastructure spending for nine major Latin American
economies on which we have country data. We examine to what extent fiscal deficit
reductions and public infrastructure spending reductions went together. We also address
the question of to what extent changes in public infrastructure spending were driven by
the privatization of infrastructure and increased private spending on infrastructure. We
then link the time path of infrastructure quantity and quality to the path of infrastructure
spending in a panel data econometric analysis.2
2.  Comparative Trends in Latin American Infrastructure Quantity
and Quality
We first present an overview of the evolution of Latin America’s infrastructure
indicators.
1 To place it in perspective, we compare the experience of Latin America with
that of a set of ‘successful’ developing countries that did not need to undergo
macroeconomic adjustment for most of the 80s and 90s – the East Asian Miracle 7
economies (as given in World Bank 1994). These are Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. Further, we also assess the progress of these
two developing regions vis-à-vis the industrial economies of the OECD
2 in terms of
infrastructure indicators.
Of course, the East Asian economies were growing faster than Latin American
economies, so faster growth in infrastructure could reflect demand as well as supply. But
the arrow of causation mostly goes the other way, as fast growth in infrastructure
contributed to the faster growth in East Asia. We present a rigorous analysis of the
infrastructure-growth nexus in Calderón and Servén (2002).
We focus first on the comparative performance in terms of infrastructure stocks. Starting
with telecommunications, Figure 1a shows the evolution of main telephone lines per
worker (that is, relative to the labor force) over the last two decades across the three
regions under consideration. In each case the regional median is shown. There has been a
tremendous discrepancy in the growth in phone lines per worker between Latin America
and East Asia. In 1980, Latin America trailed East Asia by a relatively small margin – 89
vs. 132 main lines per 1,000 workers --, with both regions far behind industrial
economies. Since then, however, the number of phone lines has expanded much more
rapidly in East Asia than in Latin America. As a result, by 1997 East Asia had over twice
as many phone lines per 1,000 workers as Latin America – 500 vs. 232, respectively.
Figure 1a suggests an apparent stagnation in main phone lines in East Asia and industrial
countries in the 1990s, but this turns out to be due to the substitution of cell phones for
land mainlines. The graph including cell phones (Figure 1b) shows that in these two
regions the expansion of total telephone lines has continued without interruption
throughout the 1990s, making Latin America’s lag relative to these two regions even
greater than in the case of main phone lines. By 1997, the total number of phone lines per
1,000 workers was 718 in East Asia, compared with 289 in Latin America.
Other measures of the availability of telephone services portray a similar picture. Figure
1c reports regional medians of local connection capacity per worker. It confirms that a
huge gap has opened between East Asia and Latin America since 1980, with few signs of
abating in the 1990s. And the same pattern seems to emerge for newer
telecommunications technologies. For example, Figure 1d shows that in the late 1990s
                                                                
1 The data are drawn from the Infrastructure Database assembled for this research. A summary description
of the sources and coverage is given in Appendix A.
2 OECD is defined here excluding Korea and Mexico.3
East Asia acquired a considerable lead over Latin America in terms of the number of
Internet hosts per worker.
[Figures 1a-1d here]
The regional indicators in the above figures conceal a wide range of variation across
Latin American countries, however. Figure 1e shows that a few of them (Argentina,
Chile, Costa Rica) were roughly on par with East Asia in terms of main phone lines per
worker in 1997, with Uruguay even ahead of East Asia. At the other end, a number of
smaller economies (Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala) lag far behind. But a number of
economies, including major ones such as Brazil and Mexico, have lost considerable
ground over time: they lagged way behind East Asia in 1997, even though in 1980 they
had more phone lines per worker than the East Asia median.
3
[Insert Figure 1e here]
Figure 2a shows the trends in electricity generating capacity per worker.  Here too East
Asia has acquired a sizable advantage over Latin America during the last two decades. In
1980, East Asia’s power generating capacity per worker was only 70 percent of Latin
America’s; in 1997, it had risen to 165 percent.
[Insert Figure 2a here]
Like with telecommunications, there is considerable cross-country variation in power
generation capacity in Latin America. Figure 2b reveals that three countries exceed the
East Asia median in 1997 – Venezuela, Uruguay and Argentina. However, several major
Latin American economies lag far behind – e.g., Brazil, Ecuador, Colombia and Peru –
and have made little progress over the last two decades.
[Insert Figure 2b here]
Figure 3a shows the length of the road network per worker in Latin America and the East
Asian NICs.
4 Here Latin America has remained ahead of East Asia throughout the period
of analysis, although the gap between the two regions has narrowed considerably over
time. Figure 3b presents similar information concerning overall transport routes, which
include railways in addition to roads; the qualitative pattern is the same as in the
preceding figure. Finally, Figure 3c offers a comparative perspective in terms of paved
roads. Here the pattern is somewhat different. In 1980, Latin America was way ahead of
East Asia in terms of the length of the paved road network, but by the second half of the
1990s East Asia had reached virtual parity – with both regions far behind industrial
economies.
                                                                
3 The country detail is similar in the case of total phone lines and local connection capacity, and therefore
for the sake of brevity it is not presented.
4 Obviously, roads can vary greatly in quality, so that cross-country comparisons have to be taken with
care, particularly in the case of unpaved roads. An indicator preferable to road length, used in the text,
would be their length in terms of lane-kilometers equivalent. Unfortunately, such information is not widely
available across countries and over time.4
[Insert Figures 3a-3c here]
The country-wise detail in Figure 3d shows that in all but one of the Latin American
economies listed the length of the road network relative to the number of workers has
actually declined over the last two decades. The only exception is Uruguay, which
experienced a significant expansion – even though in 1980 it was already the country
with the largest road stock per worker. The picture in terms of paved roads is similar –
the majority of the region’s countries witnessed a decline in their paved road stock per
worker, in contrast with the expansion that took place in East Asia over the lat two
decades.
[Insert Figure 3d here]
Figure 4 shows the trends in safe water availability, in terms of the fraction of the total
population with access to safe water in the two regions. The data are much more limited
than for the earlier indicators, and span only the years 1988-93. Over that period, East
Asia has shown a steady improvement in access to clean water, while the situation in
Latin America deteriorated. As a result, by 1993 the initial advantage of Latin America
over East Asia had been reversed.
[Insert Figure 4 here]
We next turn to indicators of infrastructure quality and excess demand. Unfortunately, the
data are much more sparse on these indicators, and there are only three – telephone line
waiting times, electrical power losses and percentage of roads paved – on which we have
a continuous time series over several decades.  Figure 5a shows the waiting time for a
telephone line, calculated as the number on the waiting list for main lines divided by the
change in main lines in that year. In the early 1980s, the median waiting time was 3 years
in Latin America, versus 1.5 years in East Asia. Over the 1980s and 1990s the backlog
declined steadily in East Asia (and disappeared in industrial countries). In contrast, the
median waiting time rose sharply in Latin America over the 1980s, to decline later in the
1990s. However, by 1997 Latin America still had a median waiting time in excess of half
a year, while in East Asia the typical country had virtually no main line waiting list from
1995 on. This provides an indication of excess demand for phone lines in Latin America
in the era of macroeconomic crises in the 80s and 90s, and strongly suggests that the lag
relative to East Asia was mainly due to supply constraints rather than to lower demand.
Figures 5b and 5c report two measures of the performance of the phone network: the
number of telephone faults per 100 lines and the percentage of unsuccessful local calls. In
both cases the country coverage of the information is severely limited, so that the
regional comparisons have to be taken with caution because the regional aggregates
include only a few countries. Furthermore, the available data refer to 1991-95 only.
The percent of unsuccessful local calls does not show much difference between Latin
America and East Asia.  In turn, the data on telephone faults per main line shows much5
poorer quality of service in Latin America than in East Asia. Since we don’t have data on
earlier years, it’s impossible to say whether Latin America’s worse telephone service
quality relative to East Asia’s is due to the recent macroeconomic crisis of the past two
decades or already existed prior to that. In any case, the obvious conclusion is that Latin
America lags behind East Asia not only in the quantity of telecommunication services,
but also in their quality.
[Insert Figures 5a-5c here]
Regarding power, the percentage of transmission losses relative to total output offers a
crude measure of the efficiency of the power network. Figure 6a offers a cross-regional
perspective on power losses. The figure shows a clear deterioration in the power system
during the era of fiscal austerity in Latin America in the 1980s and 90s, with an incipient
reversion only after 1995. In contrast, East Asia had roughly constant electrical power
losses.  Thus, while Latin America’s service quantity indicator (generating capacity per
worker) shown above displayed a modest upward trend during the last two decades, the
quality of that service deteriorated sharply.
[Insert Figure 6a here]
Among Latin American countries, Figure 6b shows that only Paraguay and Costa Rica
improved upon the East Asia norm for power losses in 1997. All other countries show
higher power losses, strikingly large in some cases (the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua,
Honduras). Moreover, only four countries (Paraguay, Chile, Jamaica and El Salvador)
experienced an improvement between 1980 and 1997.
[Insert Figure 6b here]
Finally, a rough measure of the quality of the surface transportation network is given by
the percentage of roads paved. This is shown in Figure 7a, which reveals a sharp increase
in the road quality thus measured in East Asia, with the percentage of roads paved rising
from 60 to 75 percent between 1980 and 1990. In contrast, Latin America made virtually
no progress along this dimension over the last two decades. The country-specific data
(Figure 7b) show a similarly bleak picture: all Latin American countries fall well short of
the East Asia median, with Jamaica as the only country coming close to it.
[Insert Figures 7a and 7b here]6
3.  Trends in Infrastructure Spending in Latin America
On the whole, the comparative evidence just reviewed suggests that Latin America fell
behind East Asia along most dimensions of infrastructure quantity and quality over the
1980s and 1990s. The next task is to assess how these trends relate to the observed
performance of infrastructure spending in the region. To do this we use infrastructure
investment data from major Latin American countries over the last two decades.
5
Figure 8 depicts the trajectory of total infrastructure investment, as a ratio to GDP, in six
major Latin American countries since 1980. The figure reveals three salient facts: First,
the volume of infrastructure investment varies considerably across the countries shown.
In the late 1990s, it ranged from 1 percent of GDP in Mexico, to over 7 percent in
Colombia. Second, in most countries infrastructure investment experienced a substantial
decline around the mid 1980s, which was reversed only partially, if at all, in the late
1990s. Third, Colombia and Chile are exceptions to this rule: they have witnessed an
infrastructure investment expansion, particularly over the late 1990s.
[Insert Figure 8 here]
Investment performance varied also across infrastructure sectors. Figures 9a-9d depict the
trajectory of total investment, relative to GDP, in each of four major sectors –
telecommunications, power, transport and water. Investment in telecommunications
actually displayed an upward trend in a number of countries, with Brazil and Mexico as
main exceptions (Figure 9a). In power (Figure 9b), by contrast, most countries witnessed
an investment decline, particularly sharp in the case of Brazil, who had been the leading
investor in the early 1980s, and Peru, whose investment levels dropped to nothing in the
early 1990s. The only exception was Colombia, which more than doubled its power
investment in the late 1990s.
In transport (Figure 9c), investment also followed a declining trend after the mid 1980s,
with Chile as the only country to display a sustained recovery at the end of the 1990s. In
a few countries (Peru, Brazil, Argentina) investment remained at extremely low levels
throughout the 1990s. Finally, in water and sanitation (Figure 9d) both investment levels
and trends were fairly diverse across countries: investment fell to very low values in
Peru, but rose to record highs in Colombia in the late 1990s.
[Insert Figure 9 here]
                                                                
5 The data sources are described in the appendix.7
4.  The behavior of public infrastructure investment
To what extent did this performance of total infrastructure investment reflect the
performance of public investment? With the public sector as the main -- in many cases,
the only – investor, the answer is that total and public investment moved closely together
in most countries, at least until the mid 1990s. Figure 10 depicts the time path of public
infrastructure investment as percent of GDP. Except for the late 1990s, the graph is
strikingly similar to that for total investment (Figure 8 above). It shows that public
infrastructure investment collapsed after the mid 1980s in five of the six countries
considered. The exception once again was Colombia, who succeeded in maintaining her
public investment levels roughly unchanged throughout the period.
[Insert Figure 10 here]
How was public infrastructure spending affected by fiscal austerity in the 80s and 90s in
Latin America?  It is unlikely that this expenditure reduction reflected increased
efficiency of spending, as we have already seen that Latin America's infrastructure
quality remained poor throughout the period. Instead, the contraction of infrastructure
spending likely resulted from the fiscal retrenchment that the region underwent.
In fact, we can measure how much the change in infrastructure spending accounts for the
observed change in the public sector surplus in each country.  This is done in Table 1,
which compares the contraction in public investment with the change in the public sector
primary (i.e., non-interest) surplus, with both measured between the early 1980s and the
late 1990s. The table shows that total public investment fell in all countries listed except
for Bolivia. Public infrastructure investment, in turn, fell in seven out of the nine
countries in the table. It rose in Ecuador and showed virtually no change in Colombia.
Comparison of columns 1 and 2 in the table reveals that in Bolivia, Brazil and Chile
public infrastructure investment fell by more than total public investment – implying that
non-infrastructure capital spending actually rose.  The third column shows that the
primary fiscal surplus rose in eight of nine countries considered (all except Venezuela).
Columns 4 and 5 calculate the contribution of investment to the fiscal correction. Public
investment contraction contributed significantly (i.e., half of the total correction or more)
to the adjustment in five of the eight adjusting economies. Infrastructure investment
compression did the same in five economies as well. This is more remarkable because
infrastructure investment is typically a relatively small component of total public
spending. The role of infrastructure compression was particularly large in Brazil, where
the cut in infrastructure investment was almost twice as big as the fiscal correction.
Venezuela is an extreme case because it reduced total and infrastructure investment
without improving its primary surplus – so that in effect the investment compression
financed a reduction in public saving. At the other extreme, Colombia and Ecuador
managed to improve their fiscal balances without cutting public infrastructure (nor total)
investment.8
Table 1
The Contribution of Infrastructure Compression to Fiscal Adjustment




















Argentina 3.97 2.85 5.31 74.7 53.8
Bolivia -0.91 3.10 6.15 ... 50.3
Brazil 2.80 3.08 1.77 158.1 174.3
Chile 0.94 1.41 2.39 39.2 58.8
Colombia 0.45 -0.04 4.69 9.6 ...
Ecuador 1.57 -0.68 1.81 87.0 ...
Mexico 6.09 1.98 6.28 97.0 31.5
Peru 4.10 1.51 3.11 132.0 48.6
Venezuela 3.49 0.41 -1.88 ... ...
Table 2
Regression of Public Infrastructure Investment to GDP ratio on the
Primary Deficit to GDP ratio
Fixed-Effects SUR estimates, 1980-98
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic
Primary Deficit / GDP -0.0242 -7.49
Argentina –trend -0.0021 -8.01
Bolivia –trend -0.0018 -6.27
Brazil –trend -0.0023 -8.09
Chile –trend -0.0011 -3.30
Colombia –trend -0.0002 -0.88
Ecuador –trend 0.0005 2.08
Mexico –trend -0.0013 -7.24
Peru –trend -0.0011 -5.20
Venezuela –trend -0.0004 -6.69
Adjusted R**2 0.842
Number of Countries 9
Observations 170
This is just accounting without any imputing a causal role to fiscal adjustment, or even
establishing a correlation between fiscal correction and infrastructure cuts. In fact, the
(pooled) full-sample correlation between the primary deficit and the public infrastructure
investment/GDP ratio is -.195, with a standard error of .077. This however, ignores the
role of country-specific factors. A simple way to take them into account is to regress
public infrastructure investment on the primary deficit, controlling for country-specific
effects and time trends. This is done in Table 2, which shows a quantitatively small, but9
highly significant, negative association between the fiscal primary balance and public
infrastructure investment.
6 However, there are significant country-specific time trends in
infrastructure spending – negative in all cases except Ecuador – which suggest that
factors other than primary deficit adjustment may have been at work in the observed
decline of public infrastructure investment.
As we saw above, only Colombia and Ecuador escape the general trend towards
infrastructure investment compression. In fact, these are also the only two countries --
among those for which we have data -- where the composition of public investment did
not shift against infrastructure over the period of analysis. Figure 11 illustrates the
changes over time in the composition of public investment between infrastructure and
non-infrastructure items. It is immediately apparent that public infrastructure investment
lost ground relative to non-infrastructure investment in all but the two countries
mentioned. In these two countries, infrastructure investment accounted for roughly 50
percent of total public investment in the late 1990s, while in other countries (Argentina,
Mexico, Venezuela) it represented less than one-fourth of the total.
[Figure 11a-11i here
Insert 3 per page]
The decline in public infrastructure investment experienced by most countries was not
evenly distributed across infrastructure sectors. Figure 12 breaks down public
infrastructure investment into four major components – power, telecommunications,
transport and water. In a number of instances, the sharpest investment decline
corresponded to the power sector. This is the case in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru. In
other countries, however, the compression affected most severely transport investment –
Mexico, Bolivia, Venezuela. Also, by the end of the 1990s public investment in telecom
had practically disappeared in several countries.
[Figure 12a-12i here
Insert 3 per page]
In a few instances – most related precisely to the telecom sector – the declining public
investment trend documented above reflected an increasingly important role of private
infrastructure investment. But this was by no means a generalized phenomenon across
countries and infrastructure sectors. We next document the observed pattern of private
investment.
                                                                
6 The small magnitude of the regression coefficient is somewhat puzzling. Allowing for lagged effects of
the primary deficit does not lead to significant changes.10
5.  Did private investment replace public investment?
Many Latin American countries opened their infrastructure sectors to private enterprise in
the late 1980s and early 1990s. Table 3 shows the approximate date of effective opening
up in different infrastructure sub-sectors in the countries under analysis. The opening up
took a variety of forms, ranging from privatization of public enterprises, to management
contracts and private concessions. Appendix B provides a full account of the reforms
across countries and sectors (see also Estache, Foster and Wodon 2000).
Table 3
Infrastructure Sector Reform Dates
Country Telecom Electricity Roads Railways Water
Argentina 1990 1992 1990 1990 1993
Bolivia 1987 1995 -- 1996 1997
Brazil 1984 1984 1996 1996 1995
Chile 1986 1986 1994 -- 1997
Colombia 1994 1992 1993 1995-97 1993
Ecuador 1994 1996 -- -- --
Mexico 1990 1998 1989 1996 1993
Peru 1990 1994 -- -- --
Venezuela 1991 1992 -- -- --
Source: Appendix B
The private sector response to this opening up showed considerable diversity across
countries and sectors. Estache et al. (2002) and Pargal (2002) provide a detailed analysis
of this response. Here we first give a descriptive account of the patterns of private
infrastructure investment; in the next section we present some formal empirical
experiments.
The evolution of private infrastructure investment relative to GDP in six major Latin
American countries is depicted in Figure 13. In five of the six countries private
investment took off in the late 1980s or early 1990s. The exception is Brazil, where
infrastructure investment of the private sector hovered around 1 percent of GDP over the
last two decades. Among the other countries, Chile exhibited the earliest rise in private
investment, followed by a rising trend  -- also apparent in Colombia. In contrast,
Argentina and especially Mexico appear to have stagnated in the second half of 1990s.
Also, in most countries – with Colombia and Chile as the exceptions -- the total volume
of private infrastructure investment remains quantitatively modest, at 1.5 percent of GDP
or less.
[Insert Figure 13 here]
In some countries, the rise in private infrastructure investment came along with an
upward trend in overall private investment. Figure 14 shows that this was indeed the case
in Argentina, Chile, and Peru and – to a more limited extent – Mexico and Ecuador as11
well. In other cases, however, the increase in private infrastructure investment was not
matched by a parallel rise in other types of private investment. Examples of this latter
situation were Bolivia -- where non-infrastructure investment appears to have declined –
as well as Colombia and Venezuela, where overall private investment displayed abrupt
fluctuations over the period.
[Figures 14a-14i here
Insert 3 per page]
The rise in private infrastructure investment was uneven not only across countries, but
also across infrastructure sectors. Figure 15 depicts the time pattern of private investment
by sector of destination in the nine countries under analysis. In a majority of countries –
Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela -- the telecommunications sector became the
prime destination of private infrastructure spending in the late 1990s. In contrast, the
power sector took this role in Bolivia and Colombia. In Brazil there were no significant
changes in the sectoral allocation of private infrastructure investment over the period
under analysis. Finally, Mexico appears to have been the only country where the
transport sector became a prime destination for private investment.
[Figures 15a-15i here
Insert 3 per page]
How did these sectoral patterns match the reforms introduced by most countries to open
up their infrastructure sectors? It is easier to assess the response of private investment
across countries and sectors to the reforms by switching to ‘reform time’. To do this, we
examine the path of private infrastructure spending in each sector before and after the
year of reform identified in Table 3 above, which is shown as year 0 in the various panels
of Figure 16.
7
Figure 16a shows the path of private telecommunications spending in the nine Latin
American economies considered.  There has clearly been a surge of private investment in
this sector in the wake of opening up to private initiative. The largest increases were in
Argentina and Chile. Moreover, the increases are impressive compared to the average
pre-reform public spending, which was around $12 per capita.
8
Similarly, Figure 16b shows the path of private electricity spending before and after
liberalization. In most countries, private spending in this sector rose sharply around the
time of reform, although Ecuador is a conspicuous exception.  In most cases, the
increases fell short of the average pre-reform public spending per capita in the sector,
which was around $32.
In roads (Figure 16c), Chile and Mexico show strong private spending increases, while in
the other countries reforming this sector the results seem more modest. As a
                                                                
7 To smooth some large jumps in the data series, we use a centered 3-year moving average in the graphs.
8 We calculate the pre-reform public spending per capita as the average over 1970-1989 for all countries
that have data on the sector, in 1995 dollars.12
consequence, only in these two countries did total per capita spending actually rise after
the reform.
Likewise, in railways (Figure 16d) only Argentina displayed a sharp increase in private
spending per capita after the reforms. Even in that case, however, the rise was sufficient
only to keep total spending roughly at its pre-reform level (around $10). In the other
countries, total spending per capita actually declined.
Finally, results are also uneven in the water sector (Figure 16e). In Bolivia, there was an
increase in private water spending before liberalization, perhaps in anticipation of the
reform.  In Argentina, the liberalization clearly yielded significant increases in spending.
In Chile, however, private spending in the water sector showed little change after reform.
In spite of this diversity in private sector response, total per capita spending in the water
sector rose in most countries. But the main reason is that, unlike in other sectors, public
investment per capita in the water sector did not decline, but instead kept a rising trend in
the majority of countries.
[Insert Figure 16a-16e]
In summary, these ‘reform time’ graphs of private investment, as well as similar graphs
constructed for public investment (not shown here to save space) do not seem to provide
strong support for the popular perception that the reform and liberalization of
infrastructure sectors led to a surge in private investment to replace the declining public
investment. The above graphs suggest that such perception might be roughly correct in
the case of the telecommunications sector, but in the other sectors the picture appears to
be much more mixed.
This conclusion from the ‘reform time’ graphs shown is corroborated by the correlations
shown in Table 4. The overall correlation between public and private investment during
the last two decades across the nine countries under study is statistically insignificant.
Only two of the correlations by sector are significantly different from zero. They
correspond to the telecom sector, in which public and private investment are negatively
correlated, and the transport sector, where the correlation is strongly positive.
Table 4
Correlation between Sectoral Public and Private Infrastructure
Investment (Investment as a ratio to GDP, 9 Countries, 1980-98)
Total Infrastructure Investment -0.027
Power -0.010
Telecommunications    -0.270**
Roads and Railways     0.383**
Water -0.112
Note: ** denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent level
A more formal test of the hypothesis that private infrastructure spending replaced public
spending can be performed by noting that, if such view is correct, we should see more of13
a reduction in public infrastructure spending in the countries and sectors where private
infrastructure spending increased the most. To verify this, we regress public
infrastructure investment on private infrastructure investment, with both expressed as
percent of GDP.
Table 5 reports the results from three sets of regressions. The first two use aggregate
private and public infrastructure investment, and allow for country-specific constants and
time trends, using a SUR setup. The first specification reported in the table imposes a
common coefficient on private investment for all nine countries. The result is surprising.
The coefficient estimate equals .10 and is strongly significant, implying a positive
statistical association between private infrastructure spending and public infrastructure
spending, which suggests that the two are complements rather than substitutes. The
country-specific trends  (not reported to save space) are negative and significant in seven
of the nine countries, with Colombia and Ecuador as the only exceptions. In other words,
the data assign the reduction in public infrastructure spending to the pre-existing trend
rather than the increase in private infrastructure spending.
The second experiment in Table 5 reports results from a less restrictive empirical
specification which permits the private investment / GDP ratio to carry different
coefficients in each country.  The estimated coefficients vary in sign and magnitude.
Four are positive and five negative; their average equals 0.031. Four of the nine estimates
are significant at the 5 percent level, and three of these (corresponding to Colombia, Peru
and Bolivia) are positive, while the fourth (Brazil) is negative. On the whole, these results
reveal a considerable degree of cross-country diversity in the relationship between private
and public infrastructure investment. Indeed, the pooling restrictions implicit in the
earlier empirical specification (which assumed equal coefficients across countries) are
clearly invalid: a Wald test of equality of coefficients across countries yields a p-value of
less than 0.0001, unambiguously rejecting the null of equal coefficients. As for the
country-specific time trends, most (seven out of nine) are significantly negative; the
exceptions now are Chile and Ecuador, whose time trends are insignificant.
In the last experiment reported in Table 5 we repeat the regression of public on private
investment but allow for different regression coefficients for each country and sector,
along with country-and-sector-specific time trends and intercepts using a fixed-effects
specification. After dropping country-sectors with missing data, this yields a total of 32
regression estimates of the impact of private on public infrastructure investment.
Given the large number of parameters estimated, the table presents only a summary of the
results. Again the coefficient estimates show a wide dispersion. Seventeen are positive
and fifteen negative, and their mean equals 0.16. Of the sixteen estimates significantly
different from zero at the 5 percent level, eight are positive and eight negative. In spite of
this diversity, the sectoral distribution of the estimates (whose individual values are not
shown in the table) is suggestive, however. The eight significantly negative estimates
correspond to the power (four estimates), telecom and water (two each) sectors in various
countries. Interestingly, none of the transport sector offset coefficients is significantly
negative. In turn, the eight positive coefficients are found in transport (four), power14
(two), telecom and water (one each). This pattern of coefficient signs would suggest
some replacement of public by private investment in power, while in transport the
relationship between public and private spending appears to be one of complementarity.
As for the country and sector-specific time trends, the vast majority (twenty-five out of
thirty-two) remains negative. Among those statistically significant, sixteen are negative
and only two are positive.
Table 5
Regressions of Public Infrastructure Investment to GDP on Private
Infrastructure Investment to GDP
(9 Countries, 1980-98)
I. Using aggregate investment by country
   (FE-SUR estimates with country-specific constants and trends)
1.1 Pooled estimate 0.108**
Number of significantly positive trends 1
Number of significantly negative trends 7
Adjusted R-squared 0.838
1.2 Country-specific estimates (9 in total): Average 0.031
Number of significantly positive estimates 3
Number of significantly negative estimates 1
Number of significantly positive trends 0
Number of significantly negative trends 7
Adjusted R-squared 0.852
II. Using Sectoral Investment by country
   (FE-SUR estimates with country-specific constants and trends)
Country-sector-specific estimates (32 total): Average 0.162
Number of significantly positive estimates 8
Number of significantly negative estimates 8
Number of significantly positive trends 2
Number of significantly negative trends 16
Adjusted R-squared 0.859
Note: ** denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent level
We conclude that in general the observed decline in public infrastructure spending was
not closely matched with those sectors and countries where private infrastructure
spending surged. There is a lot of diversity across countries and infrastructure sectors,
and in some individual cases private infrastructure spending rises did offset public
infrastructure spending cuts. But in a large number of instances the sectors where private
spending increased the most were not those where public spending declined the most – or
even those where it declined at all. On the whole, this suggests that private sector
involvement did not lead to a generalized replacement of public spending with private
spending.  Hence, the opening up to private activity was not a panacea for Latin
America’s infrastructure woes.15
6.  Infrastructure Spending and the Quantity and Quality of
Infrastructure
Finally, we examine the link between infrastructure investment trends and the evolution
of standard indicators of infrastructure stocks and their quality. We first assess to what
extent spending on infrastructure gets translated into actual quantity increases of
infrastructure. It could be that public spending is mis-classified or is simply ineffective in
creating new infrastructure.  Pritchett (1999) reports many horror stories of public
investment not translating into effective increases in capital.  In this section, we examine
the effect of total infrastructure spending, public and private, in the respective sectors on
the growth of the corresponding infrastructure stocks for the nine Latin American
countries where we have data.
We do this by estimating regressions with the growth in physical infrastructure stocks as
dependent variable, and infrastructure investment (as a ratio to GDP) as explanatory
variable.
9  We compute separate panel estimators for each of the infrastructure sectors
under analysis.  In each case, we use a dynamic specification for the relationship between
growth in physical infrastructure stocks and infrastructure in investment, in order to
capture lags in the capital accumulation process and investment decisions. Specifically,
we include lags of both the dependent and independent variables in an  autoregressive-
distributive lag (ARDL) framework.  The lag order of the ARDL is dictated by a
compromise between the need to allow for time-to-build in the accumulation of stocks,
and the length of the available time series. For telecommunications, four lags proved
sufficient. For power and transport (roads and railways), we used up to six lags. While
this specification might be insufficient given the long delays often involved in the
construction of power plants and railway routes, the short data samples available
prevented us from using longer lag specifications.
Table 6 summarizes the empirical results of this procedure. The table reports a variety of
empirical specifications with and without country and/or time effects, which respectively
intend to capture country-specific and common factors affecting infrastructure
accumulation.  In the case of transport routes, rather than fixed effects we use each
country’s total land area (in logs) as additional explanatory variable.
10  In view of the
generous parameterization of the estimated equations, to save space the table only reports
the long-run impact of investment on the rate of accumulation of the asset in question.
                                                                
10 Other experiments using instead the log of real infrastructure spending, or its ratio to the lagged stock, as
explanatory variable yield qualitatively similar results, so we do not report them here.  In the cases of
telecom and transport routes, we also experimented with alternative definitions of the dependent variable –
total phone lines, rather than main lines, in the case of telecommunications, and total and paved roads,
rather than total roads plus railways, in the case of transport. The results were virtually indistinguishable
from those reported in the table.
10 The area variable typically carried a positive coefficient significant at the 5 percent level or better, so we
opted for retaining this specification for the transport equation. We also experimented with population
density as additional variable, but it turned always insignificant in the regressions. Finally, we also
estimated specifications including land area in the accumulation equations for phone lines and power, but
the estimated coefficient on the area variable was always very far from significance at conventional levels.16
The top block of Table 6 reports pooled OLS estimates. For all three assets, the estimated
long-run impact of total infrastructure investment on asset accumulation is positive and
significant at the 5 percent level (6 percent in the case of transport). The long-run
coefficient estimate reflects the percentage increase in the rate of asset accumulation
associated with a permanent increase in investment by 1 percentage point of GDP. Thus,
for example, the top left coefficient in the table indicates that the rate of growth of phone
lines per worker rises by 8 percent when telecom investment increases permanently by 1
percent of GDP. The explanatory power of the estimated equations varies across assets.
It is highest for telecom, where the simple ARDL specification chosen accounts for over
three-fourths of the observed variation in asset growth rates, and lowest for power, where
only 11 percent of the variation is captured by the estimates. This echoes the concerns
stated above that asset accumulation may reflect investment performance with long and
variable lags, perhaps longer than allowed for in our empirical specifications, due to the
scarce number of observations available. Further, in the case of power the lag structure
may vary considerably across countries, depending on the kind of power generation
added to the system – hydroelectric, coal and so on.
Table 6
Relationship between Physical Stocks and Investment Spending in
Infrastructure
Dependent Variable: Growth rate in physical infrastructure
Specification: Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) Model





















R**2 0.7674 0.1140 0.3762 0.3624

















F.E. (p-value) (0.0320) (0.0697) - -
R**2 0.7837 0.2435 0.3783 0.4889

















F.E. (p-value) (0.0403) (0.0813) … …
T.E. (p-value) (0.0043) (0.0156) (0.0064) (0.0090)
R**2 0.8237 0.3244 0.5137 0.531917
The next block in Table 6 adds country fixed affects to the telecom and power
regressions, and land area for roads. The long-run estimates do not change much in the
case of telecom and roads, and the explanatory power of their empirical equations rises
somewhat. For power, however, the estimated long-run effect of investment rises quite
substantially, along with the R-squared. The land area and the country fixed effects are
significant variables (although only at the 10 percent level in the case of power).
Finally, the bottom block in Table 6 adds time dummies in the empirical specification, to
control for omitted common factors driving asset accumulation across countries. The set
of dummies is highly significant in all three equations. The long-run coefficient estimates
for telecom and roads show relatively modest changes, although the fit of the respective
equations improves noticeably, especially in the case of roads, whose R-squared now
exceeds 50 percent. As for power, the estimated long-run effect becomes much bigger,
and the fit of the equation also improves substantially, with the R-squared now exceeding
30 percent.
In summary, we conclude that  infrastructure investment is a robust predictor of
subsequent changes in the physical infrastructure stock across countries and over time.
The evidence is particularly strong in the case of telecommunications and transport
routes. The simplicity of the empirical specifications employed, and the relatively short
time span of the available data, suggest that the link between investment and
infrastructure accumulation is probably much stronger in reality than the above
experiments reveal.  This broadly suggests that reductions in public, and hence total,
infrastructure spending have negatively affected the quantity of infrastructure available in
Latin America over the last two decades.
While earlier we found no systematic evidence that private investment had replaced
declining public investment in infrastructure, it is nevertheless possible that private
spending might have translated into faster stock accumulation than public spending.  The
former might have shown greater efficiency than the latter, by acquiring the same
infrastructure stocks at a lower cost. In such case, we should see a greater contribution of
private investment to stock accumulation than that of public investment.
This is investigated in Table 7, which reports similar experiments to those performed in
the preceding table but disaggregating total investment between its public and private
components. If the latter is more efficient than the former, private spending should carry
a significantly larger coefficient than the former in the infrastructure stock accumulation
regressions. The empirical results in the table only provide some evidence in favor of this
hypothesis in the case of transport routes. In such sector, the coefficient of private
investment is consistently much larger than that of public investment, although  Wald
tests show that the difference between the two is significant only when both time and
country effects are added in the regression. In contrast, in telecommunications and power
the coefficient of public investment is in most cases somewhat larger than that of public
investment, but the tests of equality yield no strong evidence against the null hypothesis
that the bang-per-buck of private and public investment is the same, regardless of
whether country and time effects are added in the equation. These results, however, have18
to be taken with some caution, since the projects falling under private initiative could be
systematically different from those undertaken by the public sector.
Table 7
Relationship between Physical Stocks, Public and Private Investment
Spending in Infrastructure
Dependent Variable: Growth rate in physical infrastructure
Specification: Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) Model































Equality Test 1/ (0.6632) (0.8289) (0.0159) (0.1527)
R**2 0.7844 0.1237 0.4383 0.4361



























F.E. (p-value) (0.0697) (0.0835) … …
Equality Test 1/ (0.9243) (0.8810) (0.1592) (0.0650)
R**2 0.7969 0.1708 0.4394 0.4953



























F.E. (p-value) (0.0285) (0.1919) … …
T.E. (p-value) (0.0059) (0.0192) (0.0473) (0.0804)
Equality Test 1/ (0.9487) (0.3672) (0.0319) (0.0339)
R**2 0.8337 0.3964 0.5691 0.5965
1/ It tests the equality of the coefficients for public and private sector. We report the p-value for this test.
On the whole, then, we find only limited evidence that private investment was more
effective than public investment in expanding infrastructure asset stocks. But what about
their quality?  Did enhanced private participation generally lead to an improvement in the
quality of infrastructure stocks?  In fact, where countries did privatize the infrastructure
sector, there is some mixed evidence of quality improvements. Table 8 shows that all the
telephone quality service indicators (telephone faults per line, percent of unsuccessful
local calls, years spent on waiting list for phone service) get significantly better, the19
higher is the share of the private sector in telecommunications spending. This result holds
whether or not one controls for country fixed effects. On the other hand, there is a
perverse result in the electricity sector, as power losses increase with increased private
share of power spending.  However, this could reflect reverse causality, as governments
may have wanted to privatize inefficient enterprises in the power sector that were running
high power losses, and/or heterogeneity among public and private power projects.
Table 8
Private Participation and Infrastructure Quality
Regression of Quality Indicators on Private Sector Investment Share
Sample: 9 largest Latin American countries
































Notes: SUR – Seemingly Unrelated Regressions, FE-SUR – Fixed Effects-Seemingly Unrelated
Regressions. Numbers in parenthesis under the coefficients represent t-statistics.
Figure 17 explores the same issue in a different way. It presents scatter plots relating
infrastructure quality indicators to the share of the private sector in total infrastructure
investment, using ten-year averages instead of the annual data underlying the regressions
in table 8; this should make it easier to detect the changes in quality if these only occur
gradually over time, as the new private sector projects reach completion and become
numerous enough to affect significantly overall infrastructure quality. Each point in the
graphs represents one country-decade observation.
The verdict from the figure is similar to that emerging from the regressions: there is a
clear association between improving quality of telecommunications service and private
participation. In the case of the power sector, there is also some hint at declining power
losses, although the evidence appears much weaker than for telecommunications.
[Insert Figure 17]20
7.  Conclusions
The 1980s and 1990s saw a widening of the infrastructure gap between Latin America
and other successful developing economies like those in East Asia.  A comparative
review of a comprehensive set of infrastructure quantity and quality indicators reveals
that during that period Latin America fell behind along most dimensions analyzed.
Latin American public infrastructure spending declined as a percent of GDP during the
era of macroeconomic crises in the 80s and 90s. Part of this decline is associated with
fiscal adjustment (reductions in budget deficits), but the magnitude of this association is
small and there is still a downward trend in infrastructure spending even after controlling
for budget balances. This suggests that some portion of the reductions in public
expenditure took place aside from deficit reduction.  Furthermore, there is only limited
evidence to support the common perception that privatization (more generally, private
sector entry in infrastructure industries) explains the observed downward trend in public
infrastructure spending.  While this seems to be true in a few cases, there are at least as
many (or even more) instances in which higher private infrastructure spending is
associated with more public infrastructure spending.
Private infrastructure spending did increase after the infrastructure sectors were opened
up to private participation, but did so very unevenly. Opening up to the private sector was
most successful in telecommunications and electricity, with water, roads, and railways
showing more uneven results, and there were some laggards even in telecommunications
and power. The levels of private infrastructure spending were generally below the pre-
reform public infrastructure spending in each sector. Moreover, there was no universal
tendency for public infrastructure spending to fall after liberalization.
Infrastructure spending is a good predictor of subsequent growth in infrastructure stocks,
particularly robust in the cases of telephone lines and transport routes, but also for power
generation capacity.  If the quantity of infrastructure has an effect on output levels, as a
growing literature has argued (Canning 1999, Calderón et al 2000), then fiscal
retrenchment implemented through cuts in public infrastructure spending represents a
myopic and potentially self-defeating adjustment strategy, as it lowers future output and
thus the tax collection and debt servicing capacity of the economy (Easterly 2000).  The
evidence also suggests that under this kind of fiscal austerity, Latin America’s increasing
infrastructure lag behind East Asia is unlikely to get better soon.
There is no clear evidence that private sector participation has raised the efficiency of
infrastructure investment – as reflected by the translation of spending into asset
accumulation. On the other hand, there is some positive evidence on the effect of the
increased private sector share of infrastructure on infrastructure quality. All of the
telephone service quality indicators improve with an increased private sector share in
telecommunications, while the evidence regarding the relationship between power sector
efficiency and private participation is less strong.21
The overall picture is that Latin America's infrastructure sector performed poorly during
the era of macroeconomic crises in the 1980s and 1990s. Privatization has so far been no
panacea, and a huge gap has opened relative to East Asian NICs.  For Latin America to
recover its long-run growth potential, increased emphasis on infrastructure policy is
desirable.
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Press.Appendix A:  The Infrastructure Database
The data underlying the analysis in this paper come from the Infrastructure
Database assembled for this work. The database includes both physical indicators of
quantity and quality of infrastructure endowments and measures of public and private
infrastructure investment expenditures. Here we give a brief description of both
components of the dataset.
A1. Physical infrastructure data
1. Public Utilities
1.1  Telephones and Telephone Main Lines
Following Canning (1998), we use the number of telephone sets and the number of main
lines connected to local telephone exchanges as our measure of the provision of
telephone services. Although both measures are highly correlated, Canning suggests that
the number of telephone main lines is a better measure of the capacity of the telephone
system.  Finally, the variables taken from Canning’s database are:
Variables Period Source
Number of Telephone Lines Annual, 1960-95 ITU, AT&T, United Nations
Discontinued after 1995
Number of Telephone Main Lines Annual, 1960-98 ITU, AT&T, United Nations
We extend  Canning’s data with more recent figures taken from the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) Annual Reports. Furthermore, ITU provides other
indicators that could be used to measure the quantity and quality of telephone services.  A
summary of the coverage and availability of those indicators is presented in Table A1.
Table A1
Variables Frequency / Period Cross Section and Time
Dimensions
I. System Capacity





1975-98: Between 55 and 175
countries. 1960-75: 10 countries.
TS: Mean of 12 observations per
country ( opc) and median of 11
opc.
II. Operation and Access





1975-97: Between 158 and 209
countries. 1960,65,70: More than
100.
Percentage of main lines
equipment for direct
international dialing
Annual, 1985-97. 1985-97: Between 80 and 109
countries.  TS: Mean of 5  opc and
median of 4 opc.
Percentage of urban main lines Annual, 1980-97.
Selected  Years: 1960,
1990-97: Between 27 and 98
countries. 1980-89: No more than23
Variables Frequency / Period Cross Section and Time
Dimensions
1965, 1970, 1975. 10. 1960-75: Only 2 countries
(HKG, SGP).  TS: Mean of 3 opc
and median of 1 opc
Percentage of residential main
lines
Annual, 1975-97.
Selected  Years: 1960,
1965, 1970.
1975-97: Between 54 and 172
countries. 1960-75: No more than
6 countries.  TS: Mean of 10  opc
and median of 9 opc





1975-97: Between 12 and 52
countries. 1960,65,70: More than
7.  TS: Mean of 3 opc and median
of 0 opc.





1975-97: Between 15 and 87
countries. 1960,65,70: 7.  TS:
Mean of 5  opc and median of 1
opc.




Selected  Years: 1960,
1965, 1970.
1975-97: Between 2 and 36
countries. 1960,65,70: Only 1
(CAN).  TS: Mean of 1  opc and
median of 0 opc.
III. Costs
Cost of 3-minute local call
(US$)
Annual, 1980-97 1990-97: Between 115 and 163
countries. 1980-89: 22 countries.
TS: Mean and median of 6 opc.
Residential monthly telephone
subscription (US$)
Annual, 1980-97 1990-97: Between 119 and 176
countries. 1980-89: 23 countries.




Annual, 1980-97 1990-97: Between 120 and 177
countries. 1980-89: 26 countries.





Annual, 1980-97 1990-97: Between 45 and
98countries. 1980-89: 6 countries.
TS: Mean and median of 2  opc,
and a maximum of 14 (GBR).
Telephone faults per 100 main
lines.
Annual, 1980-97 1990-97: Between 64 and 127
countries. 1980-89: 22 countries.
TS: Mean and median of 4 opc.
Waiting list for main lines Annual, 1975-97.
Selected Years: 1960,
1965, 1970
1990-97: Between 76 and 175
countries. 1960-75: 55 countries.
TS: Mean of 14 and median of 13
opc.24
Regarding coverage across regions, we can summarize the time-series dimensions for















I. Latin America and the Caribbean  [42 countries]
Average 27 23 23 12 3 12
Median 28 24 33 12 3 13
Min / Max 0 / 38 14 / 26 0 / 36 0 / 23 0 / 14 0 / 24
II. East Asia and the Pacific  [35 countries]
Average 25 20 17 11 4 13
Median 26 24 20 9 4 13
Min / Max 0 / 38 0 / 26 0 / 36 0 / 25 0 / 9 0 / 26
III. Western Europe  [25 countries]
Average 28 23 20 13 5 17
Median 38 26 25 16 5 20
Min / Max 0 / 38 0 / 26 0 / 35 0 / 23 0 / 17 0 / 26
From the table, it is clearly that the quality indicators, faults per 100 main lines and
waiting list for main lines, have a more limited coverage, especially the former.
1.2  Energy
The measure of infrastructure in electricity, as taken from Canning (1998), is the
electricity generating capacity (in kilowatts). We have annual observations for the 1950-
95 period. The main sources for these data was obtained from the United Nations’ Energy
Statistics and Statistical Yearbook. In Table 2 we report other variables that could be used
as proxies for energy.
Table A2
Variables Frequency / Period Cross-Section & Time Dimensions
I. Output and Consumption
Electric Power Consumption
(in kwh or kwh per capita)
Annual, 1960-97 1971-97: 130 countries. 1960-70:
27 countries.  TS: Mean of 17 opc.
Median: 26  opc, with a maximum
of 37 observations for 27 countries
Electric Production Annual, 1960-97 1971-97: 109-129 countries. 1960-
70: 24 countries.  TS: Mean of 16
opc. Median: 26  opc, with a




and Distribution Losses (% of
output)
Annual, 1960-97 1971-97: 100-129 countries. 1960-
70: 24 countries.  TS: Mean of 16
opc. Median of 18  opc, with a
maximum of 37 observations for
24 countries
Source: World Bank. World Development Indicators.  United Nations. Statistical Yearbook;
Energy Statistics25
We extend these data using mainly the United Nations Energy Statistics and Statistical
Yearbook.  Below we present some basic information on the time-series coverage of the
























I. Latin America and the Caribbean  [42 countries]
Average 27 15 15 14 14
Median 36 26 26 26 22
Min / Max 0 / 36 14 / 27 0 / 37 0 / 26 0 / 26
II. East Asia and the Pacific  [35 countries]
Average 20 13 13 13 13
Median 24 0 0 0 0
Min / Max 0 / 36 0 / 37 0 / 37 0 / 37 0 / 37
III. Western Europe  [25 countries]
Average 24 25 25 25 25
Median 36 37 37 37 37
Min / Max 0 / 36 0 / 37 0 / 37 0 / 37 0 / 37
1.3  Sanitation and Sewerage
For this category we have found observations only for selected years within the 1970-97
period.  The main source is the World Bank’s WDI. The variables are the percentage of
population access to safe water and sanitation in all areas, as well as urban and rural
areas. The limited coverage of the series could be observed in the following table that
summarizes the time dimension in some selected regions:
Safe Water (% population with access) Sanitation (% population with access) Region /
Statistics Total Rural Urban Total Rural Urban
I. Latin America and the Caribbean  [42 countries]
Average 3 3 3 2 2 2
Median 4 3 3 2 1 2
Min / Max 0 / 7 0 / 7 0 / 7 0 / 5 0 / 5 0 / 5
II. East Asia and the Pacific  [35 countries]
Average 3 3 3 2 2 2
Median 3 3 3 2 1 2
Min / Max 0 / 7 0 / 8 0 / 8 0 / 5 0 / 6 0 / 6
III. Western Europe  [25 countries]
Average 3 3 3 2 2 2
Median 3 2 2 2 1 1
Min / Max 0 / 7 0 / 7 0 / 7 0 / 5 0 / 5 0 / 526
2. Public Works
2.1  Roads
Canning (1998) presented two indicators for the stock of infrastructure in roads.
Variables Period Problems
Total Road length (in km) Annual, 1950-97 Frequent Gaps and large changes.
Differences in the definition of
roads across countries and over
time.
Paved Road length (in km) Annual, 1950-97 Large variations in quality. Data do
not reflect the width of the road and
do not account for the age of the
road.
Sources: International Road Federation, World Road Statistics. United Nations’ Regional
Commission, Statistical Yearbooks.
We extend these data using recent issues of the International Road Federation World
Road Statistics. According to Canning (1998), the raw data on road length seem too
unreliable to be useful, and even using national sources it appears impossible to construct
data that are consistent either across countries or over time.  On the other hand, Canning
uses the percentage of the main paved and unpaved road network as a measure of quality.
Other available indicators are limited in coverage and only capture the transportation
impact of these roads.
Table A3
Variables Frequency / Period Cross-Section & Time Dimensions
Road Traffic
(vehicles per km)
Annual, 1990-97 1990-97: Between 13 and 60
countries. TS: Mean of 2  opc.
Median of 0 opc, with a maximum
of 9 observations for 8 countries
Roads, Goods Transported
(million of tons per km)
Annual, 1990-97 1990-97: Between 23 and 57
countries. TS: Mean of 2  opc.
Median of 0 opc, with a maximum
of 10 observations for 4 countries
Source: World Bank. World Development Indicators.
2.2  Irrigation
The main source for measures in this category is the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators (WDI), and the variables are:27
Table A4
Variables Frequency / Period Cross-Section & Time Dimensions
Irrigated Land (hectares) Annual, 1960-97 1960-96: Between 143 and 164
countries.  TS: Mean of 25  opc.
Median of 36  opc, with a
maximum of 36 observations for
134 countries
Irrigated Land (% of crop land) Annual, 1960-97 1960-96: Between 136 and 156
countries. TS: Mean of 23  opc.
Median of 36  opc, with a
maximum of 36 observations for
122 countries
Source: World Bank. World Development Indicators
On the other hand, the time-series dimension for these indicators in some important
regions are summarized in the following table:
IRRIGATION
Region and Statistics As % of crop land In hectares
I. Latin America and the Caribbean  [42 countries]
Average 27 27
Median 36 36
Min / Max 0 / 36 0 / 36
II. East Asia and the Pacific  [35 countries]
Average 18 18
Median 25 27
Min / Max 0 / 36 0 / 36
III. Western Europe  [25 countries]
Average 16 20
Median 0 36
Min / Max 0 / 36 0 / 36
3.  Other Transport Sectors:  Railways
The only measure provided by Canning (1998) is the rail route length.  The main data
sources for the length of railway lines are Mitchell’s International Historical Statistics
(1992, 1993, 1995) until 1980 and World Bank’s Rail Statistics Database thereafter.
Canning (1998) also used national sources to supplement these data.
11
On the other hand, the World Bank has developed the Railways Database that comprises
data for the period 1980-97.  From this database, we have some variables that could be
useful to measure capacity and quality of the railways: Stock of main diesel locomotives,
                                                                
11  However, Canning suggests that the data on the length of the line could have some problems. First, it
does not take account for the number of tracks in the railway. Second, there are changes in the coverage
due to the treatment of rail lines owned by companies for industrial use and not open to the public (e.g.
railways owned by the sugar industry in Latin America).28
Stock of main electric locomotives, Passenger - kilometer (in millions), Goods
Transported, Freight ton - km (in millions),  Goods Transported, Freight ton-km per
Wagon (000),  Diesel Locomotive Availability (in %), Operating Ratio with
Normalization and without Normalization.
Finally, we summarize the time-series information across countries for some selected
regions:
Roads Railways
Region / Statistics Route Length (km) Paved Route Length
(km)
Route Length (km)
I. Latin America and the Caribbean  [42 countries]
Average 12 15 26
Median 9 12 34
Min / Max 0 / 34 0 / 34 0 / 38
II. East Asia and the Pacific  [35 countries]
Average 14 13 20
Median 9 0 32
Min / Max 0 / 36 0 / 36 0 / 38
III. Western Europe  [25 countries]
Average 21 17 24
Median 30 22 36
Min / Max 0 / 36 0 / 36 0 / 38
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A.2 Data on Investment in Infrastructure
The sample covers nine Latin American countries at annual frequency over the period
1970-98.
1. Definition of Public Sector
The following table presents the definition of public sector used in the figures of public
investment in infrastructure.
Country Telecom Power Transport Water
Argentina GG+SOE GG+SOE GG+SOE GG+SOE
Bolivia GG+SOE GG+SOE GG+SOE GG+SOE
Brazil GG+SOE GG+SOE GG+SOE No Data
Chile GG+SOE GG+SOE GG+SOE No Data
Colombia GG+SOE GG+SOE GG+SOE GG+SOE
Ecuador GG+SOE GG+SOE GG+SOE GG+SOE
Mexico GG+SOE GG+SOE GG+SOE GG+SOE
Peru GG+SOE GG+SOE GG+SOE GG+SOE
Venezuela GG+SOE GG+SOE GG+SOE GG+SOE
where GG denotes General Government Spending on Infrastructure and SOE denotes
State-Owned Enterprises Spending on Infrastructure. According to the table, we do not
data on investment in Water for Brazil and Chile.
2. Definition of Transport Sector
The definition of the transport sector varies somewhat across countries, as shown in the
table below.
Country Transportation Sector
Argentina We have data for both investment in roads and in railways (separately).
We do not have data on investment in ports and airports
Bolivia Same as in Argentina.
Brazil Same as in Argentina
Chile We only have aggregate data for investment in Transport. This includes all
categories (roads, railways, ports & airports). There is no breakdown for any
of these 4 categories.
Colombia Same as in Chile
Ecuador Same as in Argentina
Mexico Same as in Argentina
Peru Same as in Argentina
Venezuela Same as in Argentina
Notes: Aggregate data on investment in the transport sector includes spending on roads,
railways, ports and airports. However, we do not have the specific investment in each sub-sector.
We lack of data on railways for Colombia.30
3. Sources of Information
In order to obtain the data on infrastructure investment, we gather information mostly from
national sources. Here is the list of documents used:
Argentina, 1970-98
General Information: [1]  Fundacion de Investigaciones Economicas Latinoamericanas (1992).
“Capital de Infraestructura en la Argentina: Gestión Pública, Privatización y Productividad.” [2]
Secretaria de Hacienda, “Cuenta de Inversion 1994-97,” Sub-Secretaria del Presupuesto.
Telecommunications: [3]  Celani, Marcelo (1998). “Determinantes de la Inversión en
Telecomunicaciones en Argentina,” CEPAL
Power: [4] Adrián Romero, Carlos (1998). “Regulación e Inversiones en el Sector Eléctrico
Argentino,” CEPAL Serie Reformas Económicas 5
Transport: [5] Delgado, Ricardo (1998). “Inversiones en Infraestructura Vial: La Experiencia
Argentina,” CEPAL Serie Reformas Económicas 6
Bolivia, 1980-98
General Information: [1] Antelo, Eduardo (2000) "Politicas de Estabilizacion y de Reformas
Estructurales en Bolivia a partir de 1985". CEPAL Serie Reformas Economicas 62.  [2] Barja
Daza, Gover (1999c) "Las Reformas Estructurales Bolivianas y su Impacto sobre Inversiones".
CEPAL Serie Reformas Economicas 42.  [3] Instituto Nacional de Estadistica. “Bolivia en
Cifras,” Varios números.  [4]  The World Bank, “Bolivia: Public Expenditure Review,”
Washington, DC: The World Bank
Telecommunications: [5] Barja Daza, Gover (1999b) "Inversion y Productividad en la Industria
Boliviana de Telecomunicaciones". CEPAL Serie Reformas Economicas 16.
Power: [6] Barja Daza, Gover (1999a) "Inversion y Productividad en la Industria Boliviana de la
Electricidad". CEPAL Serie Reformas Economicas 15.
Brazil, 1970-98
General Information: [1] Cavalcanti Ferreira, Pedro (1996) "Investimento em Infra-estrutura no
Brasil: Fatos Estilizados e Relacoes de Longo Prazo". Pesquisa e Planejamento Economico,
26(2), August. [2] Cavalcanti Ferreira, Pedro and Thomas Georges Malliagros, (1998) "Impactos
Produtivos da Infra-estrutura no Brasil: 1950-95". Pesquisa e Planejamento Economico, 28(2),
August. [3] Cavalcanti Ferreira, Pedro and Thomas Georges Malliagros, (1999) "Investimentos,
Fontes de Financiamiento e Evolucao do Setor de Infra-estrutura no Brasil: 1950-96". FGV
EPGE Ensaios Economicos No. 346. [4]  Coes, Donald V. (1994) "Macroeconomic Crises,
Policies and Growth in Brazil, 1964-90." Washington, DC: The World Bank Comparative
Macroeconomic Studies. [5] Rigolon, Francisco J.Z. (1998). "O Investimento em Infra-estrutura e
a retomada do crescimento economico sustentado". Pesquisa e Planejamento Economico, 28(1),
April
Chile, 1980-98
General Information: [1] Ministerio de Obras Públicas, Transportes y Comunicaciones (2000).
“Inversión en Infraestructura: Rol sobre el Crecimiento, Desarrollo Económico y la
Globalización,” Santiago, Chile: Gobierno de Chile. [2] Moguillansky, Graciela (1999) “La
Inversión en Chile: ¿El Fin de un Ciclo en Expansión?,” Santiago, Chile: Fondo de Cultura31
Económica Chile S.A. [3] Moguillansky, Graciela; Bielschowsky, Ricardo (2000) “Inversión y
Reformas Económicas en América Latina,” Santiago, Chile: Fondo de Cultura Económica Chile
S.A.
Colombia, 1973-98
General Information: [1] DANE. “Cuentas Nacionales: Gastos en FBKF por sector institucional
segun finalidad 1973-95.”
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Transport: [2] Ministry of Transport.  “El Transporte en Cifras, 1970-94.” [3]  Ministry of
Transport. “El Transporte en Cifras, 1970-96.”
Ecuador, 1981-98
General Information: [1] Banco Central del Ecuador. Boletín – Anuario, Varios Números. [2]
CEPAL/PNUD (1993). "La Política Fiscal en Ecuador, 1985-91". Serie Política Fiscal 35. [3] The
World Bank (1991). "Reformas del Sector Público para lograr el crecimiento en una época de
decreciente producción petrolera," Washington, DC: The World Bank. [5]  The World Bank
(1993). "Ecuador Public Expenditure Review: Changing the Role of the State," Washington, DC:
The World Bank
Mexico, 1970-98
General Information: [1] Banco de México (1995). "La Encuesta de Acervos, Depreciacion y
Formacion de Capital," México, DF: Banco de Mexico. [2] Presidencia del Gobierno. "IV
Informe del Gobierno: Mexico 1988-98.” México, DF: Presidencia del Gobierno. [3] Presidencia
del Gobierno. "V Informe del Gobierno: Mexico 1989-99.” México, DF: Presidencia del
Gobierno. [4] Secretaría de Hacienda de México. “Inversion Pública Federal por Entidad
Federativa.”
Peru, 1970-98
General Information: [1]  Banco Central de Reserva del Perú. “Memoria Annual,” Varios
Números. [2] CUANTO S.A.  “Perú en Números,” Varios Números. [3] INEI. “Anuario
Estadístico,” Varios Números.
Venezuela, 1980-98
General Information: [1] Oficina Central de Estadistica e Informatica, "Anuario Estadistico",
Varios Números. [2]  The World Bank, "Venezuela: Decentralization and Fiscal Issues",
December 1992.
Telecommunications: [3]  Comision Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (CONATEL).  Website
Info: www.conatel.gov.ve/indicadores.htm.
                                                                
12 We should notice that DANE data have been computed according to commitments and not to cash flow
basis. Additionally, depreciation of the existing stock has also been considered.32
Appendix B
The liberalization of infrastructure industries in Latin America
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This appendix provides a brief chronology of the opening up of Latin America’s
infrastructure sectors to private participation. The discussion focuses on the nine
countries under consideration in the main text, and draws from national sources.
B.1. Overview
For each country and sector examined, we highlight the timing of (i) the sale and/or
concession of public enterprises to the private sector; (ii) the opening up to private
Greenfield projects, and (iii) the passage of reform legislation, which may precede or
follow private sector entry into old or new infrastructure projects. In some cases reform
legislation is passed in two waves: the first one aims at allowing private entry, while the
second establishes the regulatory framework in the liberalized sector. Drawing from the
country summaries that follow, it is possible to construct a comparative timetable for
each of these three reform dimensions. This is done in the three tables that follow. On the
basis of these tables, we construct Table 3 in the main text, which for each sector and
country takes as relevant date the earliest one of the three dates in the tables below.
Some specific issues should be kept in mind. First, in the telecommunications sector there
are typically two stages: privatization and liberalization (of access and/or tariffs), when
the monopoly status disappears and competition is allowed. Second, in the power sector
privatization and liberalization typically came together. Third, in the gas sector, whenever




(Year of Enactment, by Sector)
Energy Transport
Country Electricity Gas Roads Railways Telecom Water
Argentina 1989 1989 1989 1989 1989, 98 1989, 92
Bolivia 1994 ... 1998
1 1998
1 1996 2000
Brazil 1995 ... 1993
2 1994-5 1995 ...
Colombia 1991 ... 1991 ... 1991 ...
Chile 1985 1986 1990 1990 1985, 94 1988-89
Ecuador 1994 .. ... ... (Pending) ...
Mexico ... ... 1989 1995 1989, 96 ...
Peru 1992 ... ... ... 1992, 98 ...
Venezuela (Pending) ... ... ... 1990, 97 ...
Notes: (1) A concession law appeared in 1998, although 3 concessions had been granted to the private
sector since 1996 until that date. (2) In early April 2000, the government announced a new format for the
toll roads concessions to come.
                                                                
13 The material in this appendix is based on background work by Pilar Blanco.33
Table B2
Sales and/or Concession of Public Enterprises in Infrastructure Sectors
(Starting Year)
Energy Transport
Country Electricity Gas Roads Railways Telecom Water
Argentina 1992 1992 1990* 1990* 1990 1993*
Bolivia 1995 .. .. 1996* 1996 1997*
Brazil 1996 1997
1 1996* 1996* 1996 ..
Colombia 1992 1996
2 1994* .. .. ..
Chile 1986 1986* 1993* 1995-7 1986 1993*
Ecuador pending .. .. .. .. ..
Mexico .. 1995-7
3 1989* 1996* 1990 1994*
Peru 1994 .. .. .. 1994 ..
Venezuela pending .. .. .. 1991 ..
Notes: (1) Some partial divestitures were carried out. The bulk of gas generation and distribution
is in public hands.  (2) Only one privatization was carried out (Promigas).  (3)  Repsol was
partially privatized in two stages, 1995 and 1997.  * M&O with Major Private Capital
Expenditure (Concessions).
Table B3
Greenfield Projects in Infrastructure Sectors
(Starting Year)
Energy Transport
Country Electricity Gas Roads Railways Telecom Water
Argentina 1992 1996 ... ... 1990 ...
Bolivia 1997 ... ... ... ... ...
Brazil 1984 1998 ... 1996 1984 1995
Colombia 1993 1994 ... ... 1994 1997
Chile 1990 1995 ... ... 1986 1996
Ecuador 1996 ... ... ... 1994 ...
Mexico 1998 1996 ... ... 1990 1993
Peru 1996 ... ... ... 1990 ...
Venezuela 1992 ... ... ... 1991 ...
B.2. Country summaries
Argentina
Argentina started its privatization program in 1989 after the approval of the  Ley de
Reforma del Estado (No. 23696) under the  Menem presidency. That law authorised
privatization of public enterprises. (PE). The comprehensive privatization program was
launched jointly with an ambitious program of structural adjustment. Over 1990-92
twenty public enterprises were fully or partially privatized.34
In the electricity sector,  privatization of the three public enterprises (SEGBA,
HYDRONOR S.A. and AYEE) started in 1992. Although Greenfield projects had been
proposed since 1992, the bulk of them took place since 1995.
The publicly owned companies in the gas and petrol sectors were also privatized, Gas del
Estado in 1992. Only one Greenfield project was proposed in 1996 with a total
investment amount of 350 US$ million.
The  Empresa  Nacional de  Telecomunicaciones (ENTEL) started its  privatization
procedure in 1990 and was divided into four new private companies (Telecom S.A.,
Telefonica de Argentina, Telinter and Startel). As it happened in Mexico and Venezuela,
the publicly owned telecommunication companies were sold with a monopoly on basic
service for a fixed exclusivity period, but with requirements to expand and improve basic
service. Greenfield projects were also proposed since 1990, although most of them took
place since 1995, basically due to the monopoly structure of the sector after privatization.
Additionally, since 1990 the private sector was awarded toll concessions of most
transited roads. The concessionaires of toll road are responsible for maintenance,
construction and re-construction operations. There are not Greenfield projects in the
sector. In turn, concessions of railways (freight network, passenger and commuter urban
railroad) started also in 1990. There are no Greenfield projects in the sector.
Finally, water supply and sewerage services were decentralised to the provinces in 1980,
but the central government retained control over services in the capital city. In 1993, the
operation of water and sanitation services in Buenos Aires was concessioned, through
franchise bidding, to the private sector. Additionally, since 1995, some concessions
(BROT) have been awarded to the private sector to operate potable water supply and
sewerage services in the provinces of Santa Fe, Cordoba,  Corrientes, and  Tucuman.
There are no Greenfield projects in the sector. Legal support for water and sanitation
reforms comes from the Ley de Reforma del Estado in 1989, and the Decree 9999/92 to
define the regulatory framework.
Bolivia
In the telecommunications sector, the government established a new legal and regulatory
framework in 1996. The new law facilitated, among other things, the immediate entry by
the private sector into such areas as leased lines, cellular phones and data transmission.
To capitalise the sector, the national telecommunications company (ENTEL) became a
mixed corporation comprised of the government’s shares and the shares purchased by
Entel workers. Although Greenfield projects existed since 1987, they were negligible in
number and investment volume relative to other countries, however they started to have
some importance since 1996 once the new telecommunication regulation was enacted.
The general electricity law, approved in December 1994, mandated vertical de-
integration of the sector. Currently, in the electricity sector, a state owned, vertically
integrated  Empresa  Nacional de  Electricidad S.A. (ENDE) owns about 62% of the35
installed capacity, supplies around 56% of the generation sold at the bulk power level.
The investor-owned, vertically integrated Corporacion  Boliviana de  Energia  Electrica
(COBEE) owns about 19% of the total installed generating capacity. The privately-owned
Cooperativa Rural de Electrificacion (CRE) provides distribution services in Sta Cruz.
Only one Greenfield project was proposed in 1997 with an investment volume of 97 U$
millions.
Additionally, provision and distribution of gas is in public hands. Only one Greenfield
project has been proposed in 1998 with an investment volume of 2200 US$ millions. The
sector has not been liberalised.
Some railways concessions were provided to the private sector in 1996-7. No Greenfield
projects have been proposed. A law for concessions was enacted in 1998.
Roads management, maintenance, construction and re-construction are under government
control. No Greenfield projects have been proposed. A concessions Law was enacted in
1998.
Finally, only a few concessions were granted to the private sector in relation to water
supply and sewerage services in 1997. No Greenfield projects have been proposed until
now. A new Law has been presented recently (2000) to allow private participation in the
sector.
Brazil
Brazil started its privatization process under the Collor de Melo presidency in October
1991. The process began with a reduced number of public enterprises in the tradable
good sector (mining, manufactures).
Currently, in the electricity sector, Centrais Electricas Brasileiras S.A (Electrobras) is a
federal utility holding company, with four regional integrated generating and
transmission utility subsidiaries. The federal government owns, via  Electrobras’ newly
created subsidiary (SINTREL), the two high voltage interconnected transmission
systems. State government and municipalities own most of the distribution utilities. The
state of Tocatins started the privatization of its distribution utility in 1990, and other
state-owned (central and non central government) utilities were considered for
privatization in 1995, with privatisation beginning in 1996. Although Greenfield projects
started to appear in 1984, they were of negligible volume. The bulk of this type of
projects in the power sector appeared in 1996, together with the privatization process.
Only some partial divestitures were carried out in the gas sector in 1997. The bulk of the
generation and distribution of gas is in public hands. Only one important Greenfield
project (BOT type) was proposed in the sector in 1998 with a total investment volume of
2,200 US$ millions. The sector cannot be considered as having been liberalised.36
In the telecommunication sectors, full divestitures started in 1996. There have been
Greenfield project since 1984, although of negligible size and number. Greenfield
projects started to become significant in number and volume since 1997, together with
the privatization process.
As for roads, a Federal Road Concession Program for toll roads was created in 1993, with
a first wave of concessions taking place in 1996. The second wave of concessions was
prepared in 1994-5. However, state and municipal governments manage the bulk of the
road network. In early April 2000, the government announced a new format for the toll
roads concessions to come. There are no Greenfield projects in the sector.
Concerning railways, initially they were under full control of the public sector through
three public operators:  Rede  Ferroviaria Federal (RFFSA),  Ferrovias  Paulistas
(FEPASA), Companhia Vale Rio Doce (CVRD). However, poor performance resulted in
pressures to privatise the sector. The rail sector was concessioned in 1996-98. The bids
(FEPASA, RFFSA) were for the operation and maintenance of each network for a period
of 30 years. Only one Greenfield project was proposed in 1996 with a volume of 1256
US$ million.
Finally, no privatization program was carried out in the water and sewerage sectors. A
negligible number of Greenfield projects were proposed since 1995. generally of  very
modest investment volume. The sector has not been liberalised.
Colombia
The Constitucion Politica of 1991 was established to put an end to the state monopoly in
public services. After the Constitution, a significant amount of public enterprises were
singled out for privatization, among them major mining, baking and tourism enterprises.
On the telecommunications side, Colombia chose to open the sector to new competition
instead of privatization. In fact, several Greenfield projects were presented since 1994.
Reform of the power sector started in 1992 (including  privatization of some public
entities), and finished in 1998 having achieved a major degree of private participation in
the sector. A number of Greenfield projects appeared since 1993.
In the gas industry only one privatization was carried out in 1996 (Promigas). Greenfield
projects are negligible in the gas sector.
Some concessions of highways were approved in 1994. However, railways management
remains under public sector control. There are no Greenfield projects in the transport
sectors.
Finally, water supply and sewerage services were not privatised and only one Greenfield
project was proposed in 1997.37
Chile
Chile was a leader in privatization, having started its process in 1975. Two privatization
waves can be distinguished: the first during 1975-82 and the second over 1985-89.  In
1990, the new democratic government modified the privatization process, announcing
that the sale of controlling stakes to the private sector would be limited to a few small
public enterprises, while in other cases only  a minority participation would become
available to private investors. The government also announced its willingness to allow
private participation in public infrastructure projects (water and sewerage, roads and
railways).  Concessions have been a main tool for promoting competition. Laws
regulating the electric and telecommunications sectors in Chile guarantee all firms
applying for a concession the right to receive it. Concessions have been provided to any
private sector agent seeking them, even in industries or stages that are closer to being
natural monopolies. The rationale is that the regulator, by increasing the number of
producers, favours consumers by creating the conditions for more competition, but the
result is that concessions frequently overlap.
In the telecommunications sector, the  Corporacion de  Fomento de la  Produccion
(CORFO), a state-owned corporation, owned 89.5% of CTC and 99% of ENTEL until
1986. The privatization of these two public telecommunication enterprises started in 1986
and was completed in 1990. In 1994, competition for national long-distance service was
finally allowed and in 1997 seven firms joined CTC and ENTEL to compete in the
domestic long-distance service. Also, competition in cellular mobile telephony increased
and several mergers followed. Although sector Greenfield projects were already present
since1984, they become important in number and weight only since 1993-4.
The second wave of privatization in the electricity sector ran from 1986 until 1990. The
two public enterprises ENDESA (generation, distribution) and CHILECTRA
(distribution) were privatised and split into different enterprises. Greenfield projects
appeared in 1990, and started to be significant in volume (even if not in number) in 1994.
Currently all power generation belongs to the private sector.
In the gas sector no privatization as such was carried out. The generation or exploitation
is still in public hands, transportation of gas is done by public enterprises or by entities
with concession, and gas distribution is developed only by entities with concessions since
1986, when the law for concessions was enacted. Greenfield projects in the sector are
negligible.
In the road and rail sector, railways privatization started in 1995 with partial divestiture
of FEPASA and it continued with the full divestiture of Ferronor in 1997. Since 1993 the
government has been approving concessions to the private sector to manage the road
network. There are no Greenfield projects in the transport sector.
Between 1988 and 1989, new legislation decentralised responsibility for publicly owned
water and sewerage services in Chile, by creating autonomous regional service
companies. The national government owns the majority of shares in these companies38
through its Development Corporation. A national regulatory agency, the Superintendence
of Sanitary Services, was created to regulate both public and private water and sewerage
services. Under the Chilean law, all water service companies whether public or private
are structured as stock corporations and operate by virtue of concessions granted by the
Ministry of Public Works. Concessions are granted for an indefinite period of time and
were awarded since 1993. No Greenfield projects are present in the sector.
Ecuador
In the telecommunications sector, the  Instituto  Ecuatoriano de  Telecomunicaciones
(IETEL) was owned entirely by the Ecuadorian state. IETEL also had the monopoly for
local telephony, long-distance and international service. IETEL also had the authority to
regulate the telecommunication sector until 1992, when a separate regulatory
organisation was to perform this task. In 1992 a new regulatory body was created, the
Superintendencia de  Telecomunicaciones (SUPTEL), along with a new state owned
corporation named EMETEL which took over the assets of IETEL and was granted
monopoly status for the provision of local, long-distance and international telephony
services. In preparing EMETEL for privatization, in June 1997, the government divided
the firm into two limited liability companies. After rescheduling several times the auction
for both companies, when the final date arrived (Nov 20, 1997) none of the interested
investors submitted a bid. Additionally, only a few small Greenfield projects were carried
out since 1994 (2 per year).
In the electricity sector, the main entities are: the state owned and vertically integrated
Instituto Ecuatoriano de Electrificacion (INECEL), the investor-owned utility  Empresa
Electrica de Ecuador (EMELEC) which is subject to INECEL’s technical and financial
control since 1985, and several private and municipal entities. Legislation submitted to
congress in 1994 proposed to restructure the sector, advocating deregulation and
competition. The proposed law would divest all government-owned assets in generation,
transmission and distribution after reorganising INECEL and consolidating distribution
utilities into 4 or 5 enterprises. All new investment would be undertaken by the private
sector. However, the privatization process is still pending. Only one Greenfield project
was committed in 1996 with a total investment cost of 30 US$ million.
Mexico
In 1989, a law allowing privatization of the telecommunication state-owned enterprise
was enacted. Before the  privatization in 1990, TELMEX was a 66% state-owned
corporation, with the rest in hands of local private shareholders. In 1990, TELMEX was
granted a monopoly on fixed line telephone services until August 1996. After 1996 other
firms offer long-distance services, but TELMEX will maintain the monopoly for local
fixed telephony until 2026. Cellular telephony and value added services were opened to
competition immediately. Since privatization several firms have been awarded licenses
for cellular and long-distance telephony. In fact, Greenfield projects in the sector start to
be significant since 1996.39
In the electricity sector, the Comision Federal de  Electricidad (CFE) is a state owned
enterprise which currently owns and operates most generating plants serving the public
power system, and provides all transmission and distribution service except in Mexico
City. Since 1992, private power generators in the form of  IPPs, self-generators, co-
generators, and power importers are allowed to participate in the sector. Greenfield
projects are almost negligible (only 1 in 1998). The liberalization of the sector is, then,
still pending.
In the gas sector,  Repsol was partially privatised in two stages, 1995 and 1997.
Additionally, Greenfield projects started to have some weight in 1997.
Until early 1990’s, publicly-owned Ferrocarriles Nacionales de Mexico (FNM) was the
largest company in the railway sector. The process of reform took off with president
Carlos Zedillo. In February 1995, the Mexican Congress approved an amendment to the
Constitution opening opportunities for private sector investment. Privatization started in
December 1996 with concessions of 50 years. These concessions allow to operate, exploit
and build new lines. The second stage of the privatization process was the sale of the
shares owned by the government in the concessionaire companies through a public
bidding process open to private investors. By June 1999, the process of opening the main
Mexican rail lines to private operators was almost finished and virtually the whole
Mexican railroad system had been privatised.
During 1987-94, the government awarded 52 concessions of toll roads to the private
sector. In April 1997 the government announced a new plan in the road sector and, in late
1997, assumed all bank liabilities along with temporary ownership of 23 toll roads.
In the water and sewerage sector, the Federal District Water Commission awarded
general contracts for a ten-year period (with the possibility of extension) in 1993. Other
concessions were awarded to the private sector since 1994 and a small number of
Greenfield projects have been developed since 1993. Private operators are involved in
distribution and commercial activities, but not in production. Additionally, most private
participation in the sector has been carried out through PTOs (Plantas de Tratamiento), so
that full liberalization of the sector is still pending.
Peru
In the telecommunications sector, the Peruvian government sold 35% of its shares in
ENTEL and CPT to Telefonica Internacional of Spain in 1994. Telefonica took over the
operation of both firms and within a year the firms merged into a newly formed firm
called Telefonica del Peru.  At the time of privatization the firms were licensed to provide
local and long distance telephony services in the whole Peruvian territory. The license
granted a  5 year monopoly in fixed and long distance service (finishing in 1999).
Competition in public payphones, cellular (local), cable TV and value added service was
allowed. Two firms,  Telefonica and Tele2000-Bellsouth, provide cellular mobile
telephony. However, competition in the cellular sector was allowed only in Lima until
1998 when Tele2000-Bellsouth won the concession for Band B for the rest of Peru. The40
number of Greenfield projects in the telecommunications sector is almost negligible, with
3 projects in 1990 (150 US$ million) and 1 (30 US$ million) in 1995. The reason for this
is the five-year monopoly status in fixed and long-distance service given to Telefonica
del Peru. Thus, competition in the sector is still very low.
The power sector underwent restructuring and initiated a major privatization program in
1994, following enactment of a new Electric Concession Law in 1992. The law opened
the sector to private participation in all areas; required the separation of generating,
transmission and distribution functions and ownership and aimed at complete divestiture
of all state-owned sector enterprises. Currently, 62% of Peru’s generation capacity and
75% of country’s distribution system is in private hands. Although the number of
Greenfield projects in the sector has been negligible so far, additional competition being
promoted.
No liberalization has taken place in the rest of infrastructure sectors.
Venezuela
Before privatization, the Venezuelan state owned 100% of the assets in the
telecommunications sector. CANTV had full monopoly in local and long-distance
service. Since 1988, it was also the sole provider of cellular phone services. In May 1991,
a license for the provision of cellular telephony was awarded to Telcel Celular S.A., a
Consortium of Venezuelan investors and BellSouth. Thus,  Telcel  Celular S.A. started
competing with CANTV in the cellular phone business nation-wide. In November 1991,
CANTV was privatised and received a 35 year concession contract. The license granted a
monopoly status for a period of nine years in local and long-distance (national and
international) telephony services. That is the reason for the narrow number of Greenfield
Projects in Venezuela since 1991 (4 in 1998 and only 1 project from 1991 to 1996). The
sector was not liberalised until more recently (1997).
In the electricity sector, there are five state-owned and 7 investor-owned utilities (IOU).
The largest state-owned enterprises are Electrificacion de Caroni (EDELCA) and
Compañia Anonima de Administracion y Fomento Electrico (CADAFE). Electricidad de
Caracas (EdC) is the main IOU, supplying most of Caracas and holding part ownership in
3 other IOUs. Distribution systems were reorganised into regional enterprises before
privatization. CADAFE is being reorganised into 4 regional distribution units, a separate
transmission unit, and various separate hydro and thermal generating units, with
privatization expected for many of these units. There have been a few Greenfield projects
since 1992 (total of 5, one by year stopping in 1996). Liberalization of the sector is, then,
pending.
No liberalization has taken place in the rest of infrastructure sectors.41
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Telephone main lines






































Latin America East Asia 7 Industrial Countries
Figure 1b
Total phone lines































































Latin America East Asia 7 Industrial Countries
Figure 1c
Local connection capacity

















































































































(Medians by Region, 1994-97)




























































































Telephone lines per worker
(lines per thousand)



























































































Latin America East Asia 7 Industrial Countries
Figure 2b
Power generating capacity per worker
(MW per thousand)







































































Latin America East Asia 7 Industrial Countries
Figure 3b
Transport routes



































































Latin America East Asia 7 Industrial Countries
Figure 3c
Paved roads
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Figure 3d
Road length per worker
(km per thousand)






















































































































Waiting time for main lines
































































































































Latin America East Asia 7 Industrial Countries
Figure 5c
Unsuccessfull local calls























































































































Latin America East Asia 7 Industrial Countries
Figure 6b
Power losses
(percent of power output)

























Percentage of roads paved








































Latin America East Asia 7 Industrial Countries
Figure 7b
Paved road length
(percent of total road length)























Figure 8: Total Investment in Infrastructure
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Figure 9a: Investment in Telecommunications
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Figure 9b: Investment in Power


























































































































Figure 9c: Investment in Roads and Railways

























































































































Figure 9d: Investment in Water
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Figure 10: Public Investment in Infrastructure
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Figure 13: Private Investment in Infrastructure
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Figure 16a: Private Investment per capita in Telecommunications 
















































ARG BOL BRA CHL COL ECU MEX
PER VEN
Figure 16b: Private Investment per capita in Electricity 
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Figure 16c: Private Investment per capita in Roads
































































Figure 16d: Private Investment per capita in Railways
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Figure 16e: Private Investment per capita in Water
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Figure 17
 Infrastructure Quality and the Private Share of Investment in Infrastructure
Unsuccessful local calls vs. Private Investment
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Telephone Faults vs. Private Investment
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eWaiting Years per Main Line vs. Private Investment
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Electricity Losses vs. Private Investment
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